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Introduction
Two, quite different intellectual traditions exist concerning cost-benefit analysis (CBA).
One view, dominant in the United States, sees CBA as a way to identify projects that pass a
Kaldor-Hicks compensation test and advocates summing unweighted compensating or equivalent
variations. Another approach, influential in the U.K. and Europe, sees the “social welfare
function” (SWF) as the fundamental basis for policymaking.1 CBA can generally mimic the
effect of a SWF if compensating or equivalent variations are multiplied by distributive weights
that reflect the declining marginal utility of wealth and also, perhaps, social inequality aversion
(Adler 2012, pp. 109-10; Drèze and Stern 1987).
Scholarship regarding the “value per statistical life” (VSL) has generally taken the
Kaldor-Hicks approach. VSL is the marginal rate of substitution between fatality risk in a
specified time period, and wealth. In other words, it is the change in an individual’s wealth
required to compensate him for a small change in his risk of dying during the period, divided by
the risk change.2
The social value of mortality risk reduction presumably depends on our moral
assumptions about risk and equity. American law (Executive Orders 12866 and 13563) instructs
regulatory agencies to be sensitive to equity. The Institute of Medicine (2006) recommends that
“The regulatory decision-making process should explicitly address and incorporate the
distributional, ethical, and other implications of a proposed intervention along with the quantified
results of [benefit-cost analysis] and [cost-effectiveness analysis].” Yet VSL has properties that
can yield what are often viewed as inequitable evaluations of policy change. In particular, VSL
does not value reductions in mortality risk equally. In some dimensions it favors those who are
better off (e.g., individuals with higher wealth). In other dimensions, it favors the less well-off
(e.g., individuals at higher risk of dying). But how does VSL compare with other frameworks?
This article examines the social value of mortality risk-reduction through the lens of a
SWF. It asks: to what extent are the properties of VSL characteristic of various welfarist
frameworks? If one views some of the implications of using VSL to value risk policies as
inequitable, is there an SWF that exhibits a more attractive set of implications? In short, what
happens if we shift from orthodox (distributively unweighted) CBA to some alternative SWF3 as
the societal tool for evaluating risk reductions?
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To be sure, the concept of the SWF is hardly absent from scholarly discourse in the U.S. For example, it plays a
central role in scholarship regarding optimal taxation (see, e.g., Kaplow 2008). However, it has been largely absent
from U.S. scholarship and governmental practice regarding CBA.
2
In the United Kingdom, VSL is often described as the “value per prevented fatality” (VPF) and interpreted as
population aggregate willingness to pay to prevent a statistical fatality, which may depend on the nature of the tax
system used to fund the risk reduction (Jones-Lee 1989; Baker et al. 2008).
3
Note that CBA is locally equivalent to weighted utilitarianism with weights inversely proportional to individual
marginal utility of wealth (as illustrated in Part II.A).
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For choice under certainty, two SWFs are especially widespread in the literature: a
utilitarian SWF, which sums individual utilities, and a prioritarian SWF, which sums a strictly
concave function of individual utilities. Each of these can be applied under uncertainty in a
variety of manners, yielding five functional forms that will be compared with CBA: plain
utilitarianism (which we abbreviate as WU), ex post transformed utilitarianism (WEPTU), ex ante
prioritarianism (WEAP), ex post untransformed prioritarianism (WEPUP), and ex post transformed
prioritarianism (WEPTP).
Part I reviews the SWF approach and describes the five SWFs just mentioned. Part II
presents a simple model of policy evaluation, and uses it to define the concept of the “social
value of risk reduction”: the marginal social value of change in an individual’s survival
probability, that is, W / pi , with pi individual i’s survival probability. This concept can also be
defined for CBA: in this case, the social value of risk reduction is just VSLi.
In the remainder of the Article, we characterize the social value of risk reduction for the
five SWFs and CBA, focusing in particular on the properties of “wealth sensitivity” and
“sensitivity to baseline risk.”
Wealth sensitivity: Does the social value of risk reduction increase with individual
wealth? As is well known, VSL increases with wealth but cross-sectional differences in VSL
attributable to wealth are almost always suppressed in policy evaluation. Public /political
resistance to differentiating VSL by wealth is so strong that use of a different (higher) VSL was
rejected in a context where both the costs and benefits of regulation would fall on an identified
higher-income group (airline passengers; Viscusi 2009). In contrast, increases in VSL
attributable to future income growth are often incorporated in analyses (Robinson 2007). As we
shall see, the social value of risk reduction increases with wealth for CBA and for the utilitarian
SWFs, WU and WEPTU. By contrast, the prioritarian SWFs (WEAP, WEPUP, and WEPTP) need not be
positively sensitive to individual wealth in valuing risk reduction.
Sensitivity to baseline risk. Does the social value of risk reduction depend on the
individual’s baseline risk of dying? This property, the “dead-anyway effect” (Pratt and
Zeckhauser 1996) is not only of intrinsic interest, but is closely connected to the problem of
statistical versus identified lives (Hammitt and Treich 2007) and to the “rule of rescue,” a moral
imperative for decision makers to give priority to people at higher risk (Jonsen 1986). Sensitivity
to baseline risk is also closely related to the property of “risk equity”: preferring a policy that
equalizes individuals’ risks of dying, as discussed by Keeney (1980) and reflected in concerns
for environmental justice (Lazarus 1993).We note however that it has been recommended in
some policy circles to not adjust the value of lifesaving programs for the health status of the
affected population (European Commission 2001; Neumann and Weinstein 2010). As we shall
demonstrate, the social value of risk reduction increases with baseline risk for CBA and for
WEAP, and does so for WEPTU and WEPTP under certain parameter assumptions, but is independent
of baseline risk for WU and WEPUP.
3

Note that a social evaluation methodology that is either wealth-sensitive or sensitive to
baseline risk cannot have the property of “equal value of risk reduction,” such that W / pi is
identical for all individuals. The nearly ubiquitous use of a single VSL by each governmental
agency, the pressure to standardize VSLs among agencies (e.g., HM Treasury 2011) or among
countries (see, e.g., Fankhauser et al. 1997, in the context of climate change), the proscription of
an evaluation measure “that discounts the value of a life because of an individual’s disability”
(U.S. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, quoted in Neumann and Weinstein 2010), and
the adverse reaction to using a different (smaller) VSL for older people in EPA air regulations
(Viscusi 2009) are consistent with widespread interest in equal value of risk reduction. However,
equal value of risk reduction is not satisfied by CBA or by any of the SWFs except for WEPUP
and WEPTP under restrictive parameter assumptions.
In the final part of the article, we turn to the property of catastrophe aversion. If a policy
does not change the expected number of deaths, but reduces the chance of multiple individuals
dying, does that count as a social improvement? It is widely noted that incidents in which many
people die (e.g., an airliner crash or a nuclear disaster) are regarded as worse than an equal
number of fatalities in unrelated events (e.g., traffic crashes or heart attacks) and catastrophic
potential appears to be a major determinant of risk perceptions (Slovic 2000). However,
empirical evidence suggests that the public does not support using a larger VSL for catastrophic
risks (Jones-Lee and Loomes 1995; Covey et al. 2010; Rheinberger 2010). Keeney (1980) shows
that a preference for risk equity (defined as greater similarity among individual risks) is
incompatible with catastrophe aversion. While CBA, WU, WEAP, and WEPUP do not satisfy
catastrophe aversion, WEPTU and WEPTP will do so with a concave social transformation function.
Our analysis puts CBA using VSL in a new light. CBA is wealth sensitive and is
sensitive to baseline risk, but there are SWFs that lack one or both properties; conversely, CBA
is not catastrophe averse, but some SWFs are. In short, we demonstrate that the particular
manner in which VSL ranks risk-reduction measures is not the inevitable result of a welfarist
approach to policymaking. VSL’s salient features can, if seen as undesirable, be mitigated by
shifting to some alternative social welfare function.
Short proofs are provided in the text or footnotes, with longer proofs relegated to an
appendix.
I.

SWFs Under Uncertainty

The SWF approach assumes some interpersonally comparable vector-valued utility
function u(.). If x is an outcome, then u(x) = (u1(x), …., uN(x)) where ui(x) is a real number, with
N individuals in the population.4 (Throughout this article, we assume that N is the same in all
4

The ith argument of u(x), denoted ui(x), represents the well-being level of individual i in outcome x. Function u(.)
is “interpersonally comparable” in the sense that these numbers represent how well-being levels and differences are
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outcomes.) An SWF is a rule R for ranking outcomes as a function of their associated utility
vectors. It says: x ≽ y iff u(x) R u(y) (where “iff” means “if and only if”). The literature discusses
standard forms for R. One is a utilitarian SWF: x ≽ y iff

N

N

 ui ( x)   ui ( y). Another is a
i 1

“prioritarian” (additively separable, concave) SWF: x ≽ y iff

i 1

N

N

 g (u ( x))   g (u ( y)) , with g(.)
i

i 1

i 1

i

a strictly increasing and concave real-valued function. A third is the “leximin” SWF, which ranks
utility vectors according to their smallest entries, if these are equal their second-smallest, etc.
The “rank-weighted” SWF uses fixed weights α1 > α2 … > αN, with α1 the weight for the smallest
utility in a vector, α2 the second smallest, etc., and ranks vectors by summing weighted utilities.5
(On the different functional forms for an SWF, see generally Adler 2012; Bossert and Weymark
2004; Blackorby, Bossert and Donaldson 2005.)
As recent scholarship has shown, a wide range of possibilities exist for applying an SWF
under uncertainty, with different axiomatic characteristics. (See generally Fleurbaey 2010; see
also Adler 2012, Chapter 7.) In representing policy choice under uncertainty, we will use a
standard Savage-style model where there is a set of states and a fixed probability assigned to
each state s, πs. An action (e.g., governmental policy) maps each state onto an outcome. Let xa,s
be the outcome of action a in state s.
Consider first the possibilities for a utilitarian SWF. “Ex post” untransformed
utilitarianism assigns each action a number equaling the expected value of the sum of individual
utilities. In other words, a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b), with W(a) =   s  ui ( x a , s ) . “Ex post”
s

i

untransformed utilitarianism yields the same ranking of actions as “ex ante” utilitarianism,
ranking actions according to the sum of individual expected utilities. Let Ui(a) =   s ui ( x a , s ) .
s

Then “ex ante” utilitarianism says: a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b), with W(a) =

U (a) .
i

i

Ex post utilitarianism can also take a “transformed” form. Let h(.) be a strictly increasing
(but not necessarily linear) function. Then ex post transformed utilitarianism sets W(a) =
 s h( ui ( xa,s )) . Note that, if h(.) is non-linear, ex post transformed utilitarianism need not
s

i

rank actions the same way as ex ante utilitarianism.
compared between persons. For example, ui(x) > uj(y) iff individual i in outcome x is better off than individual j in
outcome y (from the perspective of a social decision maker). On interpersonal comparability, see generally Adler
(2012, Chapters 2 and 3).
5

Let u1 ( x)  u2 ( x)  ...  u N ( x) denote a rank-ordered permutation of the vector u(x). Then the rank-ordered SWF

ranks outcomes as follows, using some fixed set of strictly decreasing weights α1, …, αN: x ≽ y iff
  i ui ( x)   i ui ( y ) , with x and y two outcomes.
i

i
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Consider, next, the possibilities for a prioritarian SWF. “Ex post” untransformed
prioritarianism assigns each action a number equaling the expected value of the sum of a strictly
increasing and concave function of individual utility. In other words, a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥ W(b), with
W(a) =

  g (u ( x
s

s

i

a,s

)) . While ex post untransformed utilitarianism is mathematically

i

equivalent to ex ante utilitarianism, ex post untransformed prioritarianism is not equivalent to ex
ante prioritarianism, where W(a) =  g (U i (a)) . Finally, ex post transformed prioritarianism
i

should be mentioned: W(a) =



  h   g (u ( x
s

a,s

i

s

i


))  , with h(.) strictly increasing.


Fleurbaey (2010) focuses on the properties of a particular kind of ex post transformation:
the “equally distributed equivalent” (EDE). Let w(.) be a function from utility vectors to real
numbers corresponding to a particular SWF.6 Let u* be such that w(u*, u*, …. , u*) = w(u(x))
for a given outcome x. Define the real-valued function hEDE(.) as follows: hEDE(w(u(x))) = u*. In
the case of the utilitarian SWF, hEDE(.) is just average utility: h EDE ( ui ( x))  (1/ N ) ui ( x) ,
i

EDE

i

EDE

i.e., h (w) = w/N. In this case, h (.) is a linear function. By contrast, in the case of the
prioritarian SWF, hEDE(.) is strictly convex. Note that





h EDE  g (ui ( x))   g 1 (1/ N ) g (ui ( x))  , i.e., hEDE(w) = g-1(w/N), leading to W(a) =
i
 i





s

s



g 1 1 N  g (ui ( x a , s ))  in the case of ex post prioritarianism.
i



For simplicity, we will not consider the rank-weighted SWF or the leximin SWF. Instead,
our focus will be on different possible methodologies for applying a utilitarian or prioritarian
SWF to value risk-reduction measures.7
II.

VSL versus SWF: A Simple Model

For the remainder of the article, unless otherwise noted, we use “CBA” to mean costbenefit analysis without distributive weights. CBA ranks policies by summing equivalent or
compensating variations. As is well known, CBA does not provide a social ranking—it can
6

In the case of the utilitarian SWF, w(u(x)) =

 u ( x) ; in the case of the prioritarian SWF, w(u(x)) =  g (u ( x)) ;
i

i

i

and for the rank-weighted SWF, w(u(x)) =

i

  u ( x) .
i

i

i

7

Some authors, e.g., Ben Porath, Gilboa and Schmeidler (1997), Ulph (1982), have characterized a “hybrid”
approach. Let W(a) be the value assigned to an action by ex post (transformed or untransformed) utilitarianism,
prioritarianism, or the rank-weighted approach, and W*(a) the value assigned by, respectively, ex ante utilitarianism,
prioritarianism, or the rank weighted approach. Then if λ is between 0 and 1, the hybrid approach assigns each
action a value equaling λW(a) + (1 − λ) W*(a). This approach, too, is beyond the scope of the current article.
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violate completeness and transitivity (Blackorby and Donaldson 1986). However, we can use
CBA to define a social ranking of alternatives using equivalent variations from a fixed baseline.8
Consider some baseline action O, the “status quo” action. Let a, b, … be other possible actions
(governmental policies). For a given such action a, let individual i’s equivalent variation EVia be
the change to individual i’s wealth in every state of the world, in O, sufficient to make i ex ante
indifferent as between O and a. Then we will say that CBA ranks actions by saying: a ≽ b iff
WCBA(a) ≥ WCBA(b), where WCBA(a) =

 EV

i

a

.

i

In order to compare CBA to various SWFs, we adopt the following simple, one-period
model—one that is frequently used in the discussion of VSL. Each policy a, b, … is such that
each individual has the same wealth (cia, cib, etc.) in all states as a result of that policy (although
not necessarily the same across policies or individuals.). Thus the model allows for interpersonal
differences in wealth, and for a policy to cause changes in an individual’s wealth (although we
will not focus on policy-induced changes in wealth in this article).
For a given policy, the state determines which individuals will be alive or dead. We
introduce lia,s, which takes the value 1 if individual i is alive and 0 if dead. Utility functions u(.)
and v(.) are the (common and interpersonally comparable) utility functions of wealth if
individuals are alive and dead, respectively (i.e., v(.) is the bequest function).
We assume, as is standard in the VSL literature, that u(c) > v(c), u′(c) > v′(c) ≥ 0, and
u′′(c) ≤ 0, v′′(c) ≤ 0. We refer to this set of assumptions as the “standard” utility model (although
it should be recognized that the assumptions are not entailed by expected utility theory; we relax
some of them in Part V.B).
Let pia be individual i’s probability of being alive with policy a, that is, pia =

 l

a,s

s i

.

s

Then Ui(a), individual i’s expected utility with action a, is simply pia u(cia) + (1 − pia) v(cia).
Some of our results depend upon a zero bequest function, i.e., v(c) = 0 for all c. Note that
this is consistent with the standard utility model.9
8

Alternatively, one can construct a ranking using the sum of compensating variations from a fixed baseline where
individual i’s compensating variation CVia is the change to individual i’s wealth in every state of the world, in a,
sufficient to make i ex ante indifferent as between O and a, CVib is the analogous change to individual i’s wealth in
every state of the world, in b, and so forth. The social ranking based on compensating variation can violate the
Pareto principle, while the social ranking based on equivalent variation cannot. The reason is that the individual's
marginal utility of wealth can depend on the state of the world (e.g., if he lives or dies). An individual may prefer a
to b, but if his marginal utility of wealth in a exceeds his marginal utility of wealth in b, CVia can be smaller than
CVib. If no one else in the population is affected by shifting from the status quo to a or to b, then a is Pareto superior
to b yet CBA using compensating variation will rank b superior to a. This situation cannot arise using the social
ranking based on equivalent variation from a fixed baseline, which always adds wealth to the states associated with
the same action (the status quo action 0).
9
In distinguishing between the case where v(c) = 0 and v(c) ≠ 0, we are assuming that the common, interpersonally
comparable utility function u*(c, l) that gives rise to u(.) and v(.)—l a variable indicating whether the individual is
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A.

The Social Value of Risk Reduction: The Benchmark Case

We first use this simple model to define the social value of risk reduction for three
“benchmark” SWFs: ex post untransformed utilitarianism (which is equivalent, recall, to ex ante
utilitarianism); ex post untransformed prioritarianism, and ex ante prioritarianism. As a
shorthand, we will refer to ex post untransformed utilitarianism/ex ante utilitarianism as the
“plain utilitarian” SWF—by contrast with the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF. Each of these
approaches (like CBA or other SWFs) ranks policies via a rule of the form: a ≽ b iff W(a) ≥
W(b). Moreover, in the case of the simple one-period model under discussion, the W-functions
associated with the three benchmark SWFs are especially tractable.
Let WU, WEPUP, and WEAP denote the W-functions associated, respectively, with plain
utilitarianism, ex post untransformed prioritarianism, and ex ante prioritarianism. Then the
following can be straightforwardly established:
WU(a) =

U (a)
i

i

WEPUP(a) =

  p g (u(c ))  (1  p ) g (v(c ))
a
i

a
i

a
i

a
i

i

WEAP(a) =

 g (U (a)) .
i

i

Note that, in each case—as with WCBA—the ranking of policies is just a function of each
individual’s wealth and the probability of her death. Moreover, these simple formulas (as with
WCBA) hold true regardless of the degree to which individuals’ survival risks are correlated. They
hold true both in the case of statistically independent survival risks and in the case where there
are some pairs of individuals whose survival risks are positively or negatively correlated.
Furthermore, in the case where policies represent a small variation in individual risk
and/or wealth around the status quo policy O, we can use the total differential to approximate a
change in WCBA, WU, WEPUP, and WEAP. As a shorthand, and without risk of confusion, we will
use the term pi to mean individual i’s survival probability in the status quo (strictly, piO); ci to
mean individual i’s wealth in the status quo (strictly, ciO); Ui her expected utility in the status quo
(strictly, UiO); and a function incorporating these terms (such as U i / pi ) to mean the function
evaluated at the status quo values (here, U i / pi evaluated at the values UiO and piO).
Consider, now, some policy a that changes each individual i’s survival probability by dpia
and her wealth by dcia. Then it can be seen that:
alive or dead—is unique up to a positive ratio transformation, not merely a positive affine transformation.
Prioritarian SWFs, indeed, make stronger assumptions on the measurability of utility than utilitarianism.
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[dc

dWCBA(a) =

 VSLi dpia ] ,

a
i

i

where VSLi is individual i’s marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and
U i / pi
u (ci )  v(ci )
wealth in O, i.e.,
, which equals
.10 Similarly,
U i / ci
pi u(ci )  (1  pi )v(ci )
dWU(a) =

[dc [ p u(c )  (1  p )v(c )] dp [u(c )  v(c )]]
a
i

i

i

i

a
i

i

i

i

i

dWEPUP(a) =

[dc [ p g(u(c ))u(c )  (1  p ) g(v( c )) v( c )]  dp [ g( u( c ))  g( v( c ))]]
a
i

i

i

i

i

i

a
i

i

i

i

i

dWEAP(a) =

[dc [ g(U )( p u(c )  (1  p )v(c )]  dp [ g(U )(u(c )  v(c ))]] .
a
i

i

i

i

i

i

a
i

i

i

i

i

It is useful to think of WCBA, WU, WEPUP, and WEAP as different methodologies for
assigning a “social value” to policies. Note that, in each case, the total differential allows us to
distinguish (1) the change in “social value” associated with the change in individual i’s wealth
(dci) from (2) the change in “social value” associated with the change in her survival probability
(dpi). The latter change is just (W / pi )dpi . For short, let us say that the social value of risk
reduction, for a given individual i, according to a given W, is just W / pi . (To be clear, this
social value may well depend upon i’s wealth in the status quo ci, her survival probability pi, or
both.)
The social values of risk reduction, for CBA and the three benchmark SWFs, are as
follows:

u (ci )  v(ci )
W CBA
 VSLi 
pi
pi u(ci )  (1  pi )v(ci )
W U
 u (ci )  v(ci )
pi

W EPUP
 g (u (ci ))  g (v(ci ))
pi

10

Note that dWCBA can be obtained from dWU by weighting dci and dpi by the inverse of the expected marginal

utility of wealth,

piu  1  pi  v . In other words, CBA is locally equivalent to weighted utilitarianism with

weights inversely proportional to marginal utility of wealth.
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W EAP
 g (U i )(u (ci )  v(ci )) .
pi
Because CBA and each of the three benchmark social welfare functions are additively separable
across individuals, the social value of a policy that changes several individuals’ risks is simply
the sum of the social values of the individual changes.
B.

Ex Post Transformed Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism

Even using the simple model set forth in this part, the social value that the ex post
transformed utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs assign to the status quo or a given policy cannot be
expressed as a function of individuals’ wealth amounts and survival probabilities without
considering the extent to which individual risks are correlated. Thus, with these two SWFs, it is
not meaningful to speak of the social value of reducing a given individual’s risk, as a function of
her wealth and survival probability, without further information about the correlation of her
survival with others’.
To illustrate, consider the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF with h(.) the logarithm.
Assume that u(c) = √c, v(c) = √c/2, and some state s* has probability 0.25. There are three
individuals, all with wealth 100: Joe, Jane, and Sally. Imagine, first, that in the status quo Joe
survives in other states and dies in s*; Jane and Sally also die in s*; and a policy saves Joe in s*,
reducing his fatality risk from 0.25 to 0. The social value of this individual risk reduction is 0.25
∙ (ln(20) – ln (15)). Imagine, now, that in the status quo Jane and Sally survive in s*, and the
policy once more saves Joe in s*, again reducing his fatality risk from 0.25 to 0. Now, the social
value of this risk reduction is 0.25 ∙ (ln(30) – ln(25)).
The general framework for transformed settings can be introduced as follows. Let
X k  (u(ck ), v(ck ); pk ), k=1,…, N, be a random variable which indicates that X k equals u (ck )
with probability pk and equals v(ck ) otherwise. Welfare under ex post transformed utilitarianism
and under ex post transformed prioritarianism are then given respectively by:
N

W EPTU  Eh( X k )
k 1

N

W EPTP  Eh( g ( X k )) .
k 1

W

EPTU

Consistent with the example above, observe that the exact relationship between either
or W EPTP and survival probabilities depends on the correlations across the X k k=1,…N,

expressed through the expectation operator E. It is beyond the scope of this article to provide a
full treatment of the social value of risk reduction for the ex post transformed SWFs. Rather, we
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consider the case of independent individual risks, which correspond to the case where the
random variables X k , k=1,…, N, are statistically independent.
As with CBA and the benchmark SWFs, we can use the total differential to obtain:

W EPTU
W EPTU
dc

dpi and dWEPTP(a) =
(a ) = 

i
ci
pi
i
i

EPTU

dW

W EPTP
W EPTP
dc

i c i i p dpi ,
i
i

with the derivatives evaluated at status quo wealth and survival probability. The social value of
risk reduction for individual i is

W EPTU
for the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF, and
pi

W EPTP
for the ex post transformed prioritarian SWF.
pi
Under the assumption of statistical independence, we can derive closed-form expressions
for these social values. To do so, it is useful to define the indirect function
H ( x)  Eh( x   X k ) . Observe that H ( x) inherits the properties of h( x) ; in particular H ( x) is
k i , j

increasing iff h( x) is increasing, and H ( x) is concave (convex) iff h( x) is concave (convex).
Then we can write
W EPTU  pi p j H (u (ci )  u (c j ))  pi (1  p j ) H (u (ci )  v(c j ))  (1  pi ) p j H (v(ci )  u (c j ))
(1  pi )(1  p j ) H (v(ci )  v(c j )).

We then obtain the social value of risk-reduction under ex post transformed utilitarianism, which
is given by

W EPTU
 p j H (u (ci )  u (c j ))  (1  p j ) H (u (ci )  v(c j ))  p j H (v(ci )  u (c j ))
pi
(1  p j ) H (v(ci )  v(c j )).
The social value of risk-reduction under ex post transformed prioritarianism can be
obtained in a similar fashion (by simply replacing X k and its realizations by g ( X k ) ). These

W EPTU
W EPTP
closed-form expressions for
and
in terms of the survival probability of
pi
pi
individual i, the wealth and survival probability of some other individual j, and the indirect
function H (which takes account of the wealth and survival probabilities of everyone else in the
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population) are useful in examining the sensitivity to wealth and to baseline risk of

W EPTU
and
pi

W EPTP 11
.
pi
III.

Wealth Sensitivity
The prior part defined the social value of risk reduction, W / pi , for CBA, three

benchmark SWFs, and two transformed SWFs (assuming independent survival outcomes). We
now ask: How do these different approaches compare in assigning social value to risk reduction?
In the status quo, individual i has wealth ci and survival probability pi, while individual j has a
different amount of wealth cj and/or a different survival probability pj. How does the social value
of risk reduction for the first individual, W / pi , compare with the social value of risk reduction
for the second, W / p j — with “social value” calculated using WCBA or, alternatively, WU,
WEPUP, WEAP, WEPTU, or WEPTP?
Consider the case where individual i has more status quo wealth than individual j (ci > cj)
and both have the same survival probability pi = pj. This set-up allows us to isolate the effect of
individual wealth on the social value of individual risk reduction. We define a social ranking as
(positively) wealth sensitive if it always assigns higher value to reducing the risk of the wealthier
of two individuals having the same mortality risk.
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A different and perhaps slightly more transparent closed-form expression for these social values is as

follows. Let N be the set of individuals and M a subset of N. Let Pi(M) denote

p 
O

k

k M

Si(M) denote

 u (c

O

k

)

k M

W

EPTU

pi



O

l N \[ M { i }]

O

v(cl ) . Then it can be shown that:

l N \[ M { i }]



Pi (M )  h( Si (M )  u (ci ))  h (Si (M )  v (ci )) . Similarly, let Gi(M) denote

M [ N \{i }]

 g (u (c

k

k M



(1  pl ) . And let

)) 


l N \[ M { i }]

g (v(cl )) . Then:

W

EPTP

These formulas make it clear how





pi

Pi (M)  h  Gi (M)  g (u (ci ))   h  Gi ( M)  g (v(ci ))  .

M [ N \{ i }]

W

EPTU

pi

and

W

EPTP

pi

depend not only on individual i’s attributes, but

also upon the wealth and survival probabilities of everyone else in the population. By contrast, as can be seen from
the analysis in Part II.A above, the social values of risk reduction for CBA and the three benchmark SWFs depend
only upon the wealth ci and survival probability pi of the individual i whose risk is being reduced.
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Definition 1: Let ci > cj and pi = pj. A social ranking is (positively) wealth sensitive iff
W W
.

pi p j
Note that the social value of risk reduction is positive for all of the W-functions
W pi
W W
considered here, regardless of individual wealth and baseline risk. Thus
iff

pi p j
W / p j
> 1. In what follows, we often focus on the ratio

W pi 12
.
W / p j

We first discuss the wealth sensitivity of CBA and the three benchmark SWFs. CBA is
(positively) sensitive to individual wealth. As is well known, CBA assigns the wealthier
individual a greater social value of individual risk reduction: VSLi/VSLj > 1. The same is true of
u (ci )  v(ci )
plain utilitarianism:
> 1, on the assumption that u′(.) > v′(.).
u (c j )  v (c j )
However, ex post untransformed prioritarianism and ex ante prioritarianism do not
necessarily assign the wealthier individual a greater social value of risk reduction. In the case of
g (u (ci ))  g (v(ci ))
ex post untransformed prioritarianism, the relevant ratio is
. In the case of ex
g (u (c j ))  g (v(c j ))
ante prioritarianism, it is

g (U i )(u (ci )  v(ci ))
. With ci > cj, these ratios can be greater than, less
g (U j )(u (c j )  v(c j ))

than, or equal to one, depending on the functional forms of g(.), u(.), and v(.).13 Under
prioritarianism, there is a tension between the positive effect of wealth on the individual’s utility
gain from survival and its negative effect on her social priority. We therefore arrive at our first
result.
PROPOSITION I: CBA and plain utilitarianism are (positively) wealth sensitive: the social
value of individual risk reduction increases with individual wealth. In the case of ex post
untransformed prioritarianism and ex ante prioritarianism, the social value of individual
12

In this article, we are interested in the ordinal properties of the different W functions (WCBA, WU, etc.), i.e., the
ordinal ranking of policies that they generate. Our interest in the ratio just described is consistent with the fact that W
f (W ) f (W )
merely has ordinal significance. Let f(.) be any differentiable, strictly increasing function. Then
iff

pi
p j
f (W )

W
pi

 f (W )

W
p j

iff

W / pi
W / p j

 1 , since f '(.) > 0 as are W / pi and W / p j .

13

Consider, first, ex post untransformed prioritarianism. The ratio is greater than one in the case of a zero bequest
function, the case considered immediately below. Alternatively, let v(.) = ku(.) with 0< k< 1. With g(x) = log x, the
ratio is unity while with g(x) = −1/x for instance, the ratio is less than one. Next consider ex ante prioritarianism. As
discussed immediately below, the ratio can be greater than, less than, or equal to one even if the bequest function is
constrained to be zero, and a fortiori without such constraint.
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risk reduction can increase with individual wealth, decrease with individual wealth, or
remain constant—depending on the functional forms of g(.), u(.), and v(.).
This is an important result. CBA’s positive wealth sensitivity in valuing risk reduction
does not emerge as a general feature of welfarism (even if we confine our attention to the three
benchmark SWFs, let alone other SWFs). Although VSLi increases with individual wealth, that is
not necessarily true of

W EAP
W EPUP
or
.
pi
pi

Can we achieve clearer results regarding the wealth sensitivity of ex post untransformed
prioritarianism and ex ante prioritarianism by restricting the bequest function to be zero (v(.) =
0)? With a zero bequest function, ex post untransformed prioritarianism is only well-defined if
g(0) is well-defined.14 Continuing to focus on the case where ci > cj and pi = pj, the ratio

W EPUP / pi
g (u (ci ))  g (0)
becomes
, which is greater than unity, since g(.) and u(.) are
EPUP
W
/ p j
g (u (c j ))  g (0)
strictly increasing.
However, even with a zero bequest function, ex ante prioritarianism may be insensitive or

W EAP / pi
g (U i )u (ci )
negatively sensitive to wealth. Note that the ratio
becomes
. Setting g(.)
EAP
W
/ p j
g (U j )u (c j )
= log makes this ratio unity. Moreover, if the g(.) function is more concave than the logarithm,
ex ante prioritarianism is negatively wealth-sensitive—assigning a lower social value to risk
reduction for wealthier individuals.15
Let us turn now to the wealth-sensitivity properties of the transformed SWFs (with
independent survival risks).16 From the equality obtained in Part II, and assuming pi  p j , we
obtain:

W EPTU W EPTU

 H (u (ci )  v(c j ))  H (v(ci )  u (c j )) . Note that this last expression is
pi
p j

always positive when ci  c j (assuming u '(.)  v '(.) ). Therefore the property is identical to that
derived under the plain utilitarian SWF. A similar result is easily obtained for the prioritarian

14

This rules out strictly increasing, strictly concave g(.) functions with g(0) = −∞, such as the log function, or –
(1/x)γ with γ > 0.
g (U i )u (ci )
15
Let F(c) = g′(pu(c))u(c). Then
 1 (resp. < 1) for any ci > cj with a zero bequest function reduces to
g (U j )u (c j )
F′(.) > 0 (resp. < 0) for all c. But note that F′(c) > 0 for all c just in case −xg′′(x)/g′(x) > 1 for all x, i.e., g(.) has a
degree of concavity globally less than unity; that F′(c) < 0 for all c just in case −xg′′(x)/g′(x) < 1 for all x; and that
−xg′′(x)/g′(x) = 1 if g(x) = log x.
16
Recall that our discussion of the social value of risk reduction for the transformed SWFs is limited to the case of
independent survival risks.
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case, where the property is also identical to the one obtained under the corresponding
untransformed benchmark:

W EPTP W EPTP
g (u (ci ))  g (v(ci ))

iff
1.
pi
p j
g (u (c j ))  g (v(c j ))

Thus the ex post transformed utilitarian SWF, like plain utilitarianism, is wealth
sensitive. The ex post transformed prioritarian SWF is wealth sensitive under the very same
conditions (regarding the functional forms of g(.), u(.), and v(.)) that yield wealth sensitivity for
the ex post untransformed prioritarian SWF.17
IV.

Sensitivity to Baseline Risk (and Risk Equity)

It is often argued that policy makers should be sensitive to how risks are distributed in the
society. Beginning with Keeney (1980), an extensive theoretical and empirical literature has been
devoted to the analysis of social risk equity (see, e.g., Gajdos et al. 2010 for an extensive list of
references).
Our model allows us to isolate the effect of individual survival probability on the social
value of risk reduction—by considering a case where individual i has survival probability pi in
the status quo, individual j has survival probability pj, with pi > pj, and the two individuals have
the same wealth. We define (positive) sensitivity to baseline risk as follows:
Definition 2: Let pi > pj and ci = cj. A social ranking is (positively) sensitive to baseline risk iff
.
As is well-known, VSLi/VSLj < 1; hence CBA accords a higher social value to individual
risk reduction for individuals at lower survival probability. This is the so-called “dead anyway”
effect (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996). Ex ante prioritarianism also displays the dead-anyway effect:

W EAP / pi
simplifies to g′(Ui)/g′(Uj) in the case at hand, which is less than unity because Ui >
W EAP / p j
Uj and g(.) is strictly concave, i.e., gʹ is strictly decreasing. By contrast, for plain utilitarianism
and ex post untransformed prioritarianism, the social value of risk reduction is insensitive to
baseline risk. Note that W U / pi and W EPUP / pi are, each, solely a function of i’s wealth; and
thus

W / pi
is, in each case, unity where i and j have the same wealth, regardless of their
W / p j

survival probabilities.

17

In particular, with a zero bequest function, the ex post transformed prioritarian SWF—like its untransformed
counterpart—is wealth sensitive.
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PROPOSITION II: CBA and ex ante prioritarianism are (positively) sensitive to baseline
risk. By contrast, plain utilitarianism and ex post untransformed prioritarianism are
insensitive to baseline risk.
Scholarship on risk reduction often discusses whether a preference for aiding “identified”
rather than “statistical” victims is justified. We might say that an individual is an “identified”
victim if her probability of surviving the current period, absent governmental intervention, is
zero or (more generally) sufficiently low. An immediate implication of Proposition II is that
CBA and ex ante prioritarianism, but not plain utilitarianism or ex post untransformed
prioritarianism, display a preference for aiding identified victims. Concerns about environmental
justice and cumulative risk are also consistent with a social value of risk reduction that is
increasing with the individual’s baseline risk, at least to the extent that the baseline risk is
determined by environmental exposures.
Sensitivity to baseline risk is closely related to the property of risk equity, examined by
Keeney (1980) and Bovens and Fleurbaey (2012)—a preference for equalizing survival
probabilities. Imagine that, in the baseline, individual j has a lower survival probability than
individual i: pj < pi. A policy increases individual j’s survival probability to pj + ∆p, and
decreases individual i’s survival probability to pi − ∆p, leaving j still at a survival probability no
larger than i. (In other words, the policy secures a Pigou-Dalton transfer in survival probability.)
The policy does not change other individuals’ survival probabilities, or anyone’s wealth. Then
we say: (1) a policymaking methodology has a weak preference for risk equity if it prefers the
policy to baseline as long as i and j have the same wealth; and (2) a policymaking methodology
has a strong preference for risk equity if it prefers the policy to baseline regardless of the wealth
of the two individuals.
Definition 3: Let pi' = pi – p ≥ pj' = pj + p, with p > 0. Consider a policy a leading to (pi',
pj') and the status quo O leading to (pi, pj) while leaving unaffected everyone’s wealth and
the survival probabilities of everyone excluding i and j. A social ranking satisfies a weak
preference for risk equity iff a ≻ O for ci = cj and a strong preference for risk equity iff a ≻ O
holds ci, cj.
Sensitivity to baseline risk is clearly a necessary condition for a weak or strong
preference for risk equity. The preference relationship in the definition of weak risk equity
preference is satisfied for infinitesimal p if and only if the social ranking is positively sensitive
to baseline risk. Thus plain utilitarianism and ex post transformed prioritarianism do not satisfy
risk equity.
Conversely, we show in the Appendix that CBA18 and ex ante prioritarianism exhibit risk
equity preference in the weak sense. This holds true as long as u(.) and v(.) satisfy the standard
18

Several qualifications to the result should be noted (see Appendix). First, CBA has been defined here in terms of
equivalent variations. CBA in terms of compensating variations does not satisfy risk equity preference. Second, risk
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conditions. Moreover, with a logarithmic g(.) function and a zero bequest function, ex ante
prioritarianism satisfies risk equity in the strong sense. However, this latter result does not
extend beyond this special case (see Appendix).
PROPOSITION III: CBA and ex ante prioritarianism satisfy risk equity preference in the
weak sense. Plain utilitarianism and ex post untransformed prioritarianism do not. Ex ante
prioritarianism satisfies risk equity preference in the strong sense under restrictive
assumptions regarding g(.) and individual utility.
Consider now the ex post transformed utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs (assuming, as
above, statistically independent risks). We saw earlier that these SWFs have the very same
wealth sensitivity properties as the corresponding benchmark SWFs—regardless of the form of
the transformation function h(.). This is not true for sensitivity to baseline risk/risk equity. We
can show that these SWFs are (positively) sensitive to baseline risk, and display a weak
preference for risk equity, if h(.) is convex. They are negatively sensitive to baseline risk if h(.) is
concave (see Appendix).19 Using Fleurbaey’s (2010) EDE transformation, the ex post
transformed utilitarian SWF is not sensitive to baseline risk (because h(.) is linear) and the ex
post transformed prioritarian SWF is sensitive to baseline risk and satisfies a weak preference for
risk equity (because h(.) = g-1(.) is convex).
The following proposition summarizes all of our results thus far regarding the
transformed SWFs.
PROPOSITION IV: The ex post transformed utilitarian SWF is (positively) wealth
sensitive; is (positively) sensitive to baseline risk if h(.) is convex; and displays a weak
preference for risk equity if h(.) is convex. The ex post transformed prioritarian SWF has
the same wealth sensitivity properties as the ex post untransformed prioritarian SWF; is
(positively) sensitive to baseline risk if h(.) is convex; and displays a weak preference for
risk equity if h(.) is convex.
V.

Equal Value of Risk Reduction

Many seem to find equal value of risk reduction—the equal valuation of lives,
independent of individual characteristics—to be a desirable feature of a policy-evaluation
equity preference has been defined here as a preference for Pigou-Dalton transfers relative to the status quo. A more
general version of weak and strong risk equity preference would change the definition so that (pi, pj) is the result of
any policy b (not necessarily the status quo). CBA even with equivalent variations does not satisfy generalized weak
risk equity preference.
19
In the Appendix, we establish that the convexity of h(.) is a sufficient condition for the ex post transformed
utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs to be (positively) sensitive to baseline risk, and to display a weak preference for
risk equity. However, the convexity of h(.) may not a necessary condition. It may be possible for there to be u(.), v(.)
and g(.) functions, consistent with the standard utility model and conditions on g(.), such that h(.) is not convex and
yet these SWF are positively sensitive to baseline risk and satisfy risk equity. By contrast, in a simpler model,
Keeney (1980) finds that a preference for risk equity is equivalent to risk-seeking preferences over the number of
fatalities (holding expected fatalities fixed).
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methodology (see Baker et al. 2008 and Somanathan 2006). Indeed, this view is reflected in
governmental use of population-average rather than differentiated VSL figures. Moreover,
Fankhauser et al. (1997) and Johansson-Stenman (2000) report that one of the most debated
issues of the socio-economic chapter of the IPCC Second Assessment Report was the use of a
smaller value of life in poor countries than in rich countries.
In this part, we first discuss equal value of risk reduction within the context of the simple
model that we set forth in Part II, and that we employed in Parts III and IV to analyze wealthsensitivity and sensitivity to baseline risk—using CBA, the three benchmark SWFs, and ex post
transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism (with independent survival risks). As shall emerge,
equal value of risk reduction is very difficult to achieve within this framework.
We then evaluate a proposal by Baker et al. (2008) that equal value of risk reduction can
be achieved via a different kind of W-function, or by relaxing the standard model of utility.
A.

Equal Value of Risk Reduction with the Simple Model

Here, we hold fixed the model of Part II—including what we term the standard utility
model for VSL, with u(c) > v(c), u′(c) > v′(c) ≥ 0 and u′′(c) ≤ 0, v′′(c) ≤ 0.
In the model of Part II, individuals are identical except for any differences in their wealth
c or survival probability p. Thus equal value of risk reduction can be defined as follows.
Definition 3: A social ranking satisfies equal value of risk reduction iff

pi, pj, ci, cj.

CBA, plain utilitarianism, ex post transformed utilitarianism, and ex ante prioritarianism
clearly fail to satisfy equal value of risk reduction. This is because each of these W functions
either has the property of wealth-sensitivity, or the property of sensitivity to baseline risk.
Having either of these properties is sufficient—obviously—for not satisfying equal value of risk
reduction.
By contrast, recall that ex post untransformed prioritarianism, WEPUP, is insensitive to
baseline risk. Recall, too, that under some conditions regarding u(.), v(.), and g(.), ex post
untransformed prioritarianism is positively or negatively wealth-sensitive (and thus fails equal
value of risk reduction). However, there are conditions on u(.), v(.) and g(.) such that ex post
untransformed prioritarianism satisfies equal value of risk reduction. 20
Recall that ex post transformed prioritarianism has the wealth-sensitivity properties of its
untransformed counterpart. Thus a necessary condition for WEPTP(.) to satisfy equal value of risk
20

Let F(c) = g(u(c)) –g(v(c)). Then it is easy to see that ex post untransformed prioritarianism satisfies equal value
of risk reduction iff F'(c) = 0. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for this to be true is v(.) = ku(.), with 0<k<1
and g(x) = log x. Note that ex post untransformed prioritarianism with a zero bequest function exhibits wealth
sensitivity (as discussed earlier) and therefore fails to satisfy equal value of risk reduction.
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reduction is that u(.), v(.) and g(.) fulfill the criteria described in the previous paragraph. By
contrast with its untransformed counterpart, however, WEPTP(.) will be sensitive to baseline risk,
positively or negatively, with convex or concave h(.) functions. Conversely, WEPTP(.) is
insensitive to baseline risk if h(.) is linear—in which case WEPTP(.) ranks policies exactly the
same way as WEPUP.
PROPOSITION V: CBA, plain utilitarianism, ex post transformed utilitarianism, and ex
ante prioritarianism do not satisfy equal value of risk reduction. Ex post untransformed
prioritarianism satisfies equal value of risk reduction under special conditions regarding
u(.), v(.) and g(.). Under those conditions, ex post transformed prioritarianism also satisfies
equal value of risk reduction with a linear h(.) that renders it equivalent to ex post
untransformed prioritarianism in the ranking of policies.
Table I summarizes the wealth- and risk-sensitivity properties of CBA, the three
benchmark SWFs, and the two transformed SWFs, and how they fare with respect to equal value
of risk reduction.

Table 1. Summary of properties
Positive Wealth
Sensitivity
CBA
Yes
Plain utilitarian SWF
Yes
Ex post transformed
Yes
utilitarian SWF
Ex ante prioritarian SWF Depends on g(.),
u(.), and v(.)
Ex post untransformed
Depends on g(.), u(.)
prioritarian SWF
and v(.). Yes with a
zero bequest
function
Ex post transformed
Depends on g(.), u(.)
prioritarian SWF
and v(.). Yes with a
zero bequest
function

B.

Positive Sensitivity to
Baseline Risk
Yes
No
Yes if h(.) is convex

Equal Value of Risk
Reduction
No
No
No

Yes

No

No

Yes under appropriate
restrictions on g(.),
u(.) and v(.)

Yes if h(.) is convex

Yes under appropriate
restrictions on g(.),
u(.) and v(.) and with
a linear h(.) function,
i.e., the same ranking
of policies as WEPUP

The Baker et al. proposal

Baker et al. (2008) suggest one may achieve equal value of risk reduction via weighted
utilitarianism. (In discussing this proposal, for the sake of clarity, we use superscripts to denote
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the status quo or alternative policies, so that piO means i’s survival probability in the status quo,
O, cja j’s wealth with policy a, and so forth.)
Let βi be a weighting factor for individual i equaling 1/ (
Consider a weighted utilitarian SWF for which W(a) =

U
i

a
i

U i
) U O , pO  1/ (u(ciO )  v(ciO )) .
pi i i

. This SWF satisfies equal value

i

of risk reduction. If i has baseline survival probability piO and baseline wealth ciO, while j has a
W / pi
possibly different baseline survival probability pjO and possibly different wealth cjO,
in
W / p j

i (u (ciO )  v(ciO )) 1/ (u(ciO )  v(ciO )) (u(ciO )  v(ciO ))

the baseline is just
=1.
 j (u (cOj )  v(cOj )) 1/ (u(cOj )  v(cOj )) (u(cOj )  v(cOj ))
However, closer inspection suggests that this SWF is problematic. The most natural
interpretation of the Baker et al. (2008) proposal is that the weights are assigned to each
individual depending upon her baseline characteristics in O, but are then held “rigid”: in order to
calculate the sum of weighted utilities for any policy a, the weighting factor for individual i is βi,
regardless of i’s characteristics (wealth and survival probability) in a. This approach violates the
“anonymity” or “impartiality” axiom – a basic principle that any minimally plausible SWF
should satisfy. Assume that, in policy a, individuals have wealth and survival probabilities ((c1,
p1), (c2, p2), … (cN, pN)), while in policy b these pairs are permuted. Then
“anonymity”/”impartiality” requires that a SWF be indifferent between a and b; but the form of
weighted utilitarianism now under discussion need not be.21
A different interpretation is the weights are not “rigid,” but instead assigned by a
weighting function. In other words, W(a) =   ( pia , cia )U ia , where  ( pia , cia )  1/ [u(cia )  v(cia )] .
i

This SWF can violate the Pareto principle (at least if the bequest function is zero). Consider a
policy that departs from baseline by increasing some individuals’ wealth, without changing
anyone’s survival probability. Then the Pareto principle obviously requires that the policy be

21

It might be protested that failures of anonymity require “large” rather than small departures from the baseline—
and Baker et al. (2008) are only proposing their SWF for small changes—but this is not true. Imagine that, in the
baseline, one individual has wealth c and another wealth c*, which is slightly larger, and that they have the same
survival probability. Imagine that the policy increases the first individual’s wealth to c* and decreases the second’s
to c. Then anonymity requires that this “small” departure from the baseline be ranked equally good as baseline; but
the “rigid” form of weighted utilitarianism will not do that.
A referee observed that CBA also violates anonymity. Assume that two individuals have identical status
quo wealth but different survival probabilities. If a policy swaps these probabilities (and changes nothing else),
anonymity requires social indifference between the status quo and the policy; but CBA will generally not be
indifferent, since the status quo expected marginal utilities of wealth used to calculate the two individuals’
equivalent variations will be different. CBA’s violation of anonymity may be seen as a reason to prefer an SWF that
satisfies anonymity (such as WU, WEPUP, WEAP, WEPTP, or WEPTU) rather than CBA or weighted utilitarianism.
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preferred, but the SWF now being discussed will be indifferent between policy and baseline
(when the bequest function is zero).22
Although Baker et al. (2008) focus on the weighted-utilitarian SWF, they suggest in a
footnote that equal value of risk reduction might also be achieved in an alternative manner—by
relaxing the standard utility model. We find this suggestion more plausible. Consider, in
particular, the possibility of setting u(c) = v(c) + k, k > 0, u'(c) = v'(c) > 0, u''(c) = v''(c) ≤ 0. It
should be stressed that these assumptions are perfectly consistent with expected utility theory.
Nor do they seem absurd. If c is defined as wealth after insurance premiums and payouts, u'(.)
and v'(.) might plausibly be equal, since optimal insurance equalizes the marginal utility of
money across states of the world.
With these specifications of u(.) and v(.), plain utilitarianism will satisfy equal value of
risk reduction.23 However, WCBA, WEAP, and WEPUP continue to violate equal value of risk
reduction.24
VI.

Catastrophe Aversion

Slovic et al. (1984) asked: “How should a single accident that takes N lives be weighted
relative to N accidents, each of which takes a single life?”. As an answer to this question, it is
often advanced that, for a given number of expected fatalities, big accidents are worse. This
catastrophe aversion preference is included in the practice of several governmental agencies

22

Admittedly, WEPUP, WEPTU, and WEPTP can also violate the Pareto principle. However, such violation only occurs
when the social planner is choosing under conditions of uncertainty. By contrast, the weighted-utilitarian SWF under
discussion in this paragraph can violate the Pareto principle even if the planner knows, for certain, how individuals
will be affected. (Even if pia is one or zero for all individuals and actions, a violation of the Pareto principle can
occur.) Arguably, an SWF which conflicts with the Pareto principle under conditions of certainty is especially
problematic. See generally Adler (2012), Chapter 7.

W

U

 u (ci )  v(ci ) = k for all ci, pi..
pi
24
Assume that for all c, u(c) – v(c) = k > 0, and thus u'(c) = v'(c). Consider two individuals with survival
u ( c j )
VSLi

probabilities pi and pj and wealth ci and cj. Then
, which is not unity with ci ≠ cj if u(.) is strictly
VSL j
u(ci )
23

Note that

concave (rather than linear).

strictly concave. Finally,

W

EPUP

W

EPUP

W

EAP

W

EAP

/ pi
/ p j

/ pi
/ p j





g (u (ci ))  g (u (ci )  k )
g (u (c j ))  g (u (c j )  k )

g (u (ci )  (1  pi ) k )
g (u (c j )  (1  p j ) k )

, which is not unity with ci ≠ cj, since g(.) is

, which is not unity with pi = pj and ci ≠ cj given the

strict concavity of g(.).
We do not establish results for WEPTU and WEPTP given the utility model u(c) = v(c) + k, k > 0, u'(c) = v'(c) >
0, u''(c) = v''(c) ≤ 0. Obviously, with a linear h(.) function, the results are the same as for WU and WEPUP,
respectively. Matters become more complex if h(.) is allowed to be non-linear and, indeed, perhaps neither concave
nor convex.
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(Bedford 2013), although the public does not seem to display such a preference (Jones-Lee and
Loomes 1995; Covey et al. 2010; Rheinberger 2010).
Keeney (1980) offers a formal definition of catastrophe aversion. Assume that policy a
has a probability πd of d premature deaths and a probability (1- πd) of no deaths, while policy b
has a probability πdʹ of dʹ premature deaths and a probability (1- πdʹ) of no deaths. Assume,
further, that the two policies have the same number of expected deaths (dπd = dʹπdʹ), but d is
smaller than dʹ. Then a policymaking tool is catastrophe-averse in Keeney’s sense (for short,
“Keeney catastrophe averse”) if it prefers policy a to b. As noted by Keeney (1980), catastrophe
aversion implies a preference for a policy in which a few (d) individuals die for sure to an
alternative in many (N) die together with probability d/N (and survive with probability 1 – d/N).
The concept of a mean-preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) suggests a
natural generalization of Keeney catastrophe aversion. Let D be a random variable representing
the number of fatalities. Let us say that a policymaking tool is “globally catastrophe averse” if it
dislikes a mean-preserving spread of D. Note that Keeney catastrophe aversion is a particular
case of global catastrophe aversion in which D is binary with one outcome having zero fatalities.
Definition 5: Let Dʹ be a mean-preserving spread of D, both random variables. Consider a
policy a leading to D fatalities and a policy b leading to Dʹ fatalities. A social ranking
exhibits strong global catastrophe aversion iff a ≻ b and weak global catastrophe aversion iff
a ≻ b holds whenever all individuals have equal wealth.
In order to decide whether a W-function satisfies catastrophe aversion, we need to be able
to associate each policy with a probability distribution D over fatalities. In the initial statement of
our simple model (Part II), each policy was characterized as an array of individual wealth
amounts, plus a state-dependent assignment of each individual to the status “dead” or “alive.”
States have exogenous probabilities. Such a characterization of a given policy a determines the
probability distribution D over fatalities associated with a.
However, in our subsequent analysis, we have generally simplified the description of
policies—so that each is characterized just as a vector of individual survival probabilities, plus
wealth amounts. In order to determine the social value of risk reduction W / pi for a given Wfunction—and in particular to assess whether W / pi has the properties of wealth-sensitivity
and sensitivity to baseline risk—it often suffices to know how the W-function ranks policies
characterized in this simpler way.25
For purposes of discussing the property of catastrophe aversion, we must revert to
thinking of policies in the initial, fuller, manner: as state-dependent assignments of individuals to
25

Recall also that such ranking was generally well defined for CBA and the three benchmarks, but not for the two
transformed SWFs absent additional information about risk correlation. Thus, in discussing the social value of risk
reduction for the transformed SWFs, we have assumed statistically independent risks.

22

the status “alive” or “dead,” plus individual wealth amounts. Why? Merely knowing the vector
of individual probabilities associated with a given policy a does not determine the distribution D
over fatalities with which a is associated.
It is clear that CBA and the three benchmark SWFs violate weak and hence strong global
catastrophe aversion. Why? Consistent with Slovic et al.’s (1984) question, assume for instance
that there are N states of the world and N individuals. With policy a, exactly one person dies in
each state. With policy b, all N die in one state and survive in every other. Catastrophe aversion
preference requires that policy a be preferred. But in this example, both CBA and the three
benchmark SWFs would be indifferent between the two policies.
An interesting topic, one we do not pursue at length, is to explore the catastropheaversion or proneness properties of CBA and the three benchmarks given various constraints on
the correlation of individual risks. If policy a is less catastrophic than b, and survival outcomes
in each policy are correlated in a certain manner, then it might be the case that CBA or one of the
three benchmarks prefers a to b, or b to a.
This observation relates to Keeney (1980) and to important subsequent work by Bovens
and Fleurbaey (2012). These scholars assume independent survival risks, and under that
constraint show a link between catastrophe-proneness and a preference for equalizing individual
risks. Translating these results into our framework, consider the following. Let O be the status
quo, and b an alternative policy, such that (1) survival risks are statistically independent with
both policies and (2) b is more catastrophic in Keeney’s sense, i.e., Keeney catastrophe aversion
requires a preference for O. Then it can be demonstrated that b can be reached from O via a
series of Pigou-Dalton transfers of individual survival probabilities. If we assume that
individuals have equal wealth, CBA and ex ante prioritarianism will prefer b to O—because
these W-functions satisfy risk equity preference with equal wealth. In short, given statistically
independent survival risks, CBA and ex ante prioritarianism are weakly Keeney catastropheprone. (By contrast, in the case considered two paragraphs above, without independent risks,
CBA and ex ante prioritarianism are neutral between a and b.)26
In any event, the basic and straightforward result here is that—without further constraints
on the correlation of individual survival risks—CBA and the three benchmarks fail weak and
strong catastrophe aversion as defined in Definition 5.
By contrast, a striking fact is that ex post transformed utilitarianism and ex post
transformed prioritarianism will satisfy weak27 Keeney catastrophe aversion if the social
transformation function h(.) is strictly concave. To see this, consider a population of N
individuals out of which d individuals will die if a catastrophe occurs. All have the same wealth
26

Other illustrative examples relating (ex ante) distributions of individual probabilities and (ex post) distributions of
fatalities are discussed in Gajdos et al. (2010).
27
Meaning that individuals have equal wealth.
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c; let “u” and “v” denote u(c) and v(c), respectively. Keep the expected number of deaths n
constant, so that the probability of catastrophe is π = n/d.
Consider ex post transformed utilitarianism. If N-d individuals are alive, the social value
of that state, according to ex post transformed utilitarianism, is h((N−d)u+dv). Accordingly,
social welfare is equal to W(d) = (n/d)h(Nu+d(v−u)) + (1−(n/d))h(Nu). Weak Keeney
catastrophe aversion means that social welfare must be decreasing in the number of fatalities d.
That is, there is weak Keeney catastrophe aversion if W′(d) < 0. We easily obtain W′(d) =
−(n/d2)[h(Nu+d(v−u))−h(Nu)] + (n/d)(v−u)h′[Nu+d(v−u)]. It is straightforward then that W′(d)
is negative for all parameters N,u,v and d if (h(s)−h(r))/(s−r) < h′(r) for all s and r such that s >
r, which indeed holds if h(.) is strictly concave.28
It is easy to generalize this result to weak global catastrophe aversion. If the random
number of fatalities is D, social welfare under ex post transformed utilitarianism simply becomes
Eh((N−D)u+Dv) in which E is the expectation operator over D. It is immediate then that there is
weak global catastrophe aversion if h((N−d)u+dv) is strictly concave in d, that is, if h is strictly
concave.
A parallel analysis shows that ex post transformed prioritarianism satisfies weak Keeney
and global catastrophe aversion if the transformation function is concave. Continuing the
discussion of the previous paragraph: social welfare under ex post transformed prioritarianism
simply becomes Eh((N-d)g(u)+dg(v)). There is weak global catastrophe aversion if h((Nd)g(u)+dg(v)) is concave in d, that is, if h is concave.29
PROPOSITION VI: Ex post transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism satisfy weak
Keeney and global catastrophe aversion if the transformation function h(.) is strictly
concave. CBA, plain utilitarianism, ex post untransformed prioritarianism, and ex ante
prioritarianism fail to satisfy Keeny and global catastrophe aversion.
It is also worth noting that Fleurbaey’s (2010) EDE transformation function hEDE(.),
combined with utilitarianism or prioritarianism, fails Keeney and global catastrophe aversion.30
28

Indeed, Wʹ(d) is negative for all parameters N, u, v, and d if and only if h(.) is strictly concave. However, it may be
possible for there to be u(.) and v(.) functions, consistent with the standard utility model, such that Wʹ(d) is negative
even with a non-concave h(.). We therefore state all the results concerning catastrophe aversion in terms of sufficient
conditions rather than equivalences.
29
Although ex post transformed utilitarianism and prioritarianism satisfy weak catastrophe aversion with an
appropriate transformation function, they are not necessarily catastrophe averse when individuals can vary in their
wealth.
30
Fleurbaey (2010) informally discusses Keeney catastrophe aversion, and suggests that it may make more sense to
reduce an independent risk than a risk that hits everyone equally. The intuition is that, when the number of expected
fatalities is given, one may prefer a catastrophe with a higher number of fatalities since this reduces ex post
inequality. At the limit, if everyone will be either alive or dead, there is maximal ex post equality. This also relates
to the idea that “misery loves company” (Bovens and Fleurbaey 2012).
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As discussed in Part I, if the underlying SWF is utilitarian, hEDE(.) is linear; if the underlying
SWF is prioritarian, hEDE(.) is strictly convex.31
V.

Conclusion

Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) evaluates the social gain from reductions in mortality risk
using the concept of the value per statistical life (VSL). As a guide to public policy, CBA using
VSL exhibits several properties concerning the social value of reducing mortality risk to
different people that some commentators perceive to be undesirable, such as positive sensitivity
to wealth and unequal value of risk reduction.
We evaluate different versions of a utilitarian or prioritarian social welfare function
(SWF), and find that these do not necessarily share the same properties as CBA. CBA exhibits
positive wealth sensitivity and positive sensitivity to baseline risk (the dead-anyway effect). The
utilitarian SWFs (plain and ex post transformed) also exhibit positive wealth sensitivity, but the
prioritarian SWFs (ex ante, ex post untransformed, and ex post transformed) may or may not do
so, depending on parameter assumptions. The ex ante prioritarian SWF exhibits positive
sensitivity to baseline risk, but the plain utilitarian SWF and ex post untransformed prioritarian
SWF are neutral to baseline risk; and the ex post transformed utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs
are positively sensitive to baseline risk if the transformation function is convex but negatively
sensitive if this function is concave.
Further, all of these methodologies satisfy a property of risk equity preference32 if and
only if they are positively sensitive to baseline risk. None of the approaches value risk reductions
equally in a population, except for the ex post prioritarian SWFs under restrictive conditions.
CBA does not exhibit catastrophe aversion, and in general neither do the SWFs, although the ex
post transformed utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs will do so with a concave transformation
function.
It is also instructive to note that the trio of properties characteristic of CBA—positive
wealth sensitivity, positive sensitivity to baseline risk/risk equity preference, no catastrophe
aversion— is not inherent to any of the SWFs we have considered, although it can be replicated
by ex ante prioritarianism with appropriate parametric assumptions.
We conclude with three possible research directions that are motivated by limitations of
the current work.
First, we have studied how a policy making assessment method (CBA or the benchmark
SWFs) would prioritize risk reductions in society, and how this depends on the properties of the
31
32

As noted in Part I, where w =



N
i 1

g (ui ) , hEDE(w) = g-1(w/N). With g(.) strictly concave, g-1(.) is strictly convex.

Strictly, “weak” risk equity preference, where the individuals involved have equal wealth.
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SWF and utility functions. But, importantly, we have not studied how those methods would
allocate the financial costs of the risk-reduction program across individuals, or how the total
social value of reducing risk varies with the assessment method and allocation of costs. It may be
useful in the future to study the general problem, namely how the different settings would fare
simultaneously with financial and risk distributional effects. This would generalize previous
models on public provision of safety (Jones-Lee 1989; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1996), assuming
some specific tax structures and SWFs.
Second, we have indicated in Part II that under transformed settings (namely ex post
transformed utilitarian and ex post transformed prioritarian SWFs), it is not possible in general to
express the social value of risk reduction as a function of individuals’ survival probabilities,
without also specifying the correlation across individual mortality risks. Following Keeney
(1980) and others, we have often assumed that individual mortality risks are statistically
independent. This suggests that there is a need to generalize this analysis to different
assumptions about dependence among individual risks. See Bommier and Zuber (2008) and
Bovens and Fleurbaey (2012, section 7) for early analyses.
Finally, we remind the reader that we have analyzed only a few SWFs. In particular we
have not studied how the rank-weighted and leximin SWFs would evaluate the social value of
risk reduction; that is also an important topic for future research.
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Appendix
We provide here proofs of the claims relating to sensitivity to baseline risk/risk equity for
CBA and the SWFs that were made but not proven in the main text.
1.

CBA and Risk Equity

(a)

CBA with Equivalent Variations Satisfies a Weak Preference for Risk Equity

Individual i has survival probability pi, individual j has survival probability pj, with pj <
pi. Both individuals have the same wealth c. If a policy decreases i’s survival probability by ∆p
and increases j’s by the same amount, then the individuals’ equivalent variations for the policy
are as follows, with ∆ci < 0 and ∆cj > 0:
(1) u(c + ∆ci)pi + v(c + ∆ci) (1 − pi) = u(c)(pi − ∆p) + v(c)(1 −pi + ∆p)
(2) u(c + ∆cj)pj + v(c + ∆cj)(1− pj) = u(c)(pj + ∆p) + v(c)(1 − pj − ∆p).
Equation (1) simplifies to:
(3) [u(c) – u(c + ∆ci)]pi + [v(c) – v(c + ∆ci)](1 −pi) = [u(c) – v(c)] ∆p.
Similarly, (2) simplifies to:
(4) [u(c + ∆cj) – u(c)]pj + [v(c + ∆cj) – v(c)](1 − pj) = [u(c) − v(c)] ∆p.
Thus:
(5)

[u(c) – u(c + ∆ci)]pi + [v(c) – v(c + ∆ci)](1 − pi) =
[u(c + ∆cj) – u(c)]pj + [v(c + ∆cj) − v(c)](1 − pj).

Use the abbreviations A* to mean [u(c) – u(c + ∆ci)], B* to mean [v(c) – v(c + ∆ci)], A to mean
[u(c + ∆cj) – u(c)] and B to mean [v(c + ∆cj) – v(c)].
Because u' > v', A* > B* and therefore piA* + (1 −pi)B* > pjA* + (1 −pj) B*.
It is therefore impossible that −∆ci = ∆cj. If that were the case, we would have a contradiction. It
would follow (given the weak concavity of u(.) and v(.)) that A* ≥ A and B* ≥ B, and thus that
piA* + (1 − pi)B* > pjA + (1 −pj)B, i.e., the left side of equation 5 would be greater than the right.
Note, finally, that the term piA* + (1 −pi)B*, the left side of equation 5, is decreasing in ∆ci.
(This can be seen by differentiating that term with respect to ∆ci.) Thus, for equation (5) to hold,
it must be that −∆ci < ∆cj, or the sum of equivalent variations is positive and risk equity
preference holds.
(b).
CBA with Equivalent Variations Satisfies Risk Equity Preference only for Pigou-Dalton
Transfers relative to the status quo, and not in general
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Let v(c) = ln c and u(c) = 2v(c), with c > 1. Assume that all individuals have income 100,
and that in the status quo both individuals i and j have survival probability 0.3. Let policy a be
such their survival probabilities are, respectively, 0.1 and 0.9; while policy b is such that their
survival probabilities are 0.4 and 0.6. Everyone else has the same survival probabilities in policy
a and b. Then policy b is an equalizing transfer relative to policy a. However it can be verified
that individual i and j have equivalent variations for policy a of, respectively, -51 and 738; while
their equivalent variations for policy b are 43 and 189. Thus the sum of equivalent variations
prefers policy a.
(c).

CBA with Compensating Variations Can Violate a Weak Preference for Risk Equity

As before, let individual i have survival probability pi, and individual j survival
probability pj, with pj < pi. Both individuals have the same wealth c. If a policy decreases i’s
survival probability by ∆p and increases j’s by the same amount, then the individuals’
compensating variations for the policy are as follows, with ∆ci < 0 and ∆cj > 0:
(1*)

u(c)pi + v(c) (1 − pi) = u(c −∆ci)(pi − ∆p) + v(c − ∆ci)(1 −pi + ∆p)

(2*)

u(c)pj + v(c)(1− pj) = u(c −∆cj)(pj + ∆p) + v(c − ∆cj)(1 − pj − ∆p).

To see a simple case where −∆ci > ∆cj and thus weak risk equity preference fails, let v(.)
= 0, pi = 1, and pj = 0, and u(.) be the square root function. Equation (1*) simplifies to:
(3*)

c

1  (1  p)2
 ci .
(1  p)2

Equation (2*) simplifies to ∆cj = c. A little manipulation of (3*) shows that, if p  1  1/ 2 
0.3, then −∆ci > c.
2.

Ex Ante Prioritarianism and Risk Equity

We stated in Part IV that ex ante prioritarianism satisfies a weak preference for risk
equity. This can be easily demonstrated. Assume, as before, pi > pj and both individuals have the
same wealth c. Assume policy a decreases i’s survival probability by ∆p and increases j’s by ∆p,
where pj + ∆p ≤ pi − ∆p. Let Uia denote i’s expected utility for the policy, i.e., (pi − ∆p) u(c) + (1
− pi + ∆p) v(c). Similarly, Uja = (pj + ∆p) u(c) + (1 − pj − ∆p) v(c). According to ex ante
prioritarianism, the change in social value associated with the policy is g(Uia) + g(Uja) – g(Ui) –
g(Uj), so the policy is preferred iff g(Uja) – g(Uj) > g(Ui) – g(Uia). Note, now, that Uja – Uj= Ui –
Uia = ∆p [u(c) – v(c)], which is greater than zero because u(c) > v(c). Moreover, because u(c) >
v(c) and pj + ∆p ≤ pi − ∆p, it follows that Uja ≤ Uia. Thus, by strict concavity of g(.), g(Uja) –
g(Uj) > g(Ui) – g(Uia).
In Part IV, we also indicated that ex ante prioritarianism with a logarithmic g(.) function
and a zero bequest function satisfies a strong preference for risk equity (i.e., even where the
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individuals do not have the same wealth). Indeed, we then have g(Uja) – g(Uj) – g(Ui) + g(Uia) =
log(pj + ∆p) − log pj + log(pi − ∆p) – log pi, which is always positive as long as pj + ∆p ≤ pi −
∆p. Nevertheless the result that ex ante prioritarianism satisfies risk equity in the strong sense
does not extend beyond the special logarithmic case. Indeed, with a zero bequest function, the
logarithmic function is the only strictly concave g(.) function with this property. To see that,
observe that wealth has no effect on g(Uja) – g(Uj) for an infinitesimal ∆p only when F(c)
=g'(pu(c))u(c) is independent of c. We obtain F '(c) = g''(pu(c))pu'(c)u(c)+ g'(pu(c))u'(c), so that
F'(c) = 0 for all c is equivalent to –xg''(x)/g'(x) = 1 for all x, or g(.)=log.
3.

Ex Post Transformed Utilitarian and Prioritarian SWFs
Assume ci  c j  c , and denote u(c)  u and v(c)  v . Using again the equality derived in

Part II, we easily obtain

W EPTU W EPTU
1

 2( pi  p j )[ H (u  v)  ( H (2u )  H (2v))] . This
pi
p j
2

expression is always negative when pi  p j for all u and v iff H ( x) , and thus also iff h( x) , is
convex. A parallel demonstration can be developed for the case of ex post transformed
prioritarianism.
It is not difficult to show that ex post transformed utilitarianism also displays risk equity
under the same condition. Assume as before ci  c j  c . The demonstration is similar to Keeney
(1980)’s. Let us define pi  p   and p j  p   so that
W EPTU  W ()  ( p   2 ) H (2u )  (2 p(1  p)  2 2 ) H (u  v)  ((1  p) 2   2 ) H (2v)
1
 W (0)  2 2 [ H (u  v)  ( H (2u )  H (2v))].
2

Therefore, for all u and v, W () is decreasing in  , iff H ( x) , and thus also iff h( x) , is convex.
Again, an exact parallel demonstration can be obtained for the ex post transformed prioritarian
case.
Note that the results in these paragraphs establish that a convex h(.) is sufficient to yield
sensitivity to baseline risk, and risk equity, for any u(.) and v(.). They do not establish that, for
some particular u(.) and v(.), a convex h(.) is necessary for sensitivity to baseline risk and risk
equity. Proposition IV in the text concerning the transformed SWFs and sensitivity to baseline
risk/risk equity is therefore formulated with the convexity of h(.) as a sufficient condition.
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